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Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision 







In our case, the debate on withdrawal of the banking supervision 
functions from Banco Central is backed by a good deal of 
political opportunism and very little reflection on the pertinent 
issues. (Gustavo H.B. Franco, O Banco Central e a supervisão 
bancária, Jornal do Brasil, 05.16.99, pg. 16). 
 
 
I – Introduction 
 
As the institution charged with monetary and exchange policy implementation and 
national financial system (SFN) regulation and supervision, Banco Central do Brasil’s 
(BCB) role is one of enormous importance. In the first grouping of responsibilities, the 
institution acts as a classic central bank and performs the task of ensuring internal and 
external currency stability.  In its supervisory role, however, it’s responsible for 
preserving financial system stability and soundness, a task not always shared by the 
central banks of other nations. In the light of international experience, this paper will 
analyze the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining these supervisory functions at 
BCB.  
 
In historical terms, there are two reasons that justify the creation and existence of a 
central bank: preservation of price stability and microeconomic questions in the 
                                                 
1 Banco Central do Brasil. The author is grateful for the collaboration, comments and suggestions offered 
by Sérgio Mikio Koyama and Victório Yi Tson Chu. Special thanks to Sérgio Mikio Koyama who 
performed the research and prepared the appendix on international empirical evidence. 5
 
framework of banking and financial system stability.
2  At the time of the gold standard, 
the primary stabilizing role of central banks was ensuring the health of the banking 
system. Today, many countries have opted to create distinct institutions, one charged 
with ensuring currency stability and the other with banking supervision.
3 
 
Many analysts hold the position that, even though central banks are the lenders of last 
resort to the banking community, these institutions should not perform the task of 
financial system supervision.  However, one cannot ignore the fact that the preservation 
of monetary stability and banking system stability are two sides of the same coin. A 
central bank would be clearly unable to preserve currency stability if the banking 
system is fundamentally unstable. Thus, one can understand that, even though 
legislation may not reserve bank supervisory functions to these institutions, central 
banks are always interested in this question. On the other hand, as recent Brazilian 
experience had demonstrated, a country cannot hope to have solid and efficient financial 
institutions in an environment of monetary instability. 
 
There are currently two universal tendencies as regards the question of governmental 
structures designed to operate monetary policy and bank and financial institution 
supervision. The first and clearest tendency is to withdraw supervisory functions from 
the “guardian of the currency”. This solution is normally seen as one of the institutional 
decisions capable of strengthening “central bank independence”.
4 The second trend – 
and one that seems to be gaining strength - is merger of the agencies charged with 
banking, securities and insurance supervision into a single agency. This is viewed as an 
instrument for further enhancing capacity to perform the financial groups’ consolidated 
supervision.
5 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of central bank creation, see GOODHART (1988), SMITH (1936) and LUNDBERG 
(1993). 
3 For an overview of the institutional structure of different countries, see GOODHART & 
SCHOENMAKER (1995) and HAUBRICH (1996). For an overview of the situation in Latin America, 
see AGUIRRE (1997). 
4  For a discussion of the major institutional aspects that define an independent central bank, see 
SWINBURNE & CASTELLO-BRANCO (1991). 
5 The most significant experience with these two trends is the English banking reform announced in May 
1997, which withdrew the bank supervisory functions previously exercised by the Bank of England and 
granted the institution independence for monetary policy purposes. The tasks of supervising banks and the 
other financial system segments, including insurance and private pension funds, were merged into a 
single agency – the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 6
 
 
In the case of Brazil, these matters are now being discussed in the framework of a new 
financial system law, as required by article 192 of the Federal Constitution. At some 
point in the near future, the government and Congress are going to have to sit down and 
negotiate and approve new national financial system legislation. We are well aware that, 
in ultimate analysis, this reform will have an eminently political character. What truly 
concerns us in all this is the possibility of coming to a decision on the organization of 
our institution without an adequate technical debate and with little or no attention to the 
progress and extremely rich experience garnered within the international community. 
For a structural reform that involves monetary policy and national financial system 
supervision, it is our understanding that due consideration must be given to the two 
major and universal tendencies – central bank independence and consolidated 
supervision of financial groups. 
 
Based on these tendencies, banking supervision should be withdrawn from Banco 
Central do Brasil, thus strengthening the institution in its task of preserving price 
stability. Parallel to this, the functions of supervising banks, financial institutions, 
securities, insurance companies and private pension funds should be brought together 
under a single roof, making it possible to supervise economic groups in all these areas 
much more effectively.  
 
Below, we have prepared a brief analysis of the ongoing debate and international 
experience regarding both monetary policy and banking supervision. In the first place, 
we will present a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining the 
banking supervision on the central bank or removing it from that institution. This 
question is viewed from the point of view of both monetary policy and banking 
supervision. Following that discussion, we will discuss the question of international 
tendencies as related to central bank reforms and the respective supervisory systems.  
Finally, in the conclusion to this paper, we will evaluate our position in light of the 





II – Survey of literature 
 
II.1 – The monetary policy perspective 
 
From the monetary policy point of view, “central bank independence”
6 constitutes a 
strong argument in favor of excluding banking supervision from the responsibilities 
reserved to a monetary authority. To a greater or lesser extent, this argument of 
protecting the “guardian of the currency” has historically explained the political option 
made by many countries to withdraw banking supervision from the central bank and 
transfer it to another government agency. 
 
In a strict sense, since currency was a commonly accepted commodity (gold or silver) 
up to the middle of the 19
th century, the concepts of central bank and monetary policy 
were born in the 20
th century. Monetary policy became viable only when bank notes and 
accounting money came into use or, in other words, when the commonly used 
commodities were substituted by credit bills (bank notes) or accounting records 
(demand deposits). 
 
The first stage of the transition from one system to the other featured the “rule of 
convertibility”, known in history as the period of the gold standard. Issuing banks were 
able to issue currency and commercial banks were able to accept demand deposits used 
in check-based transactions, provided that these liabilities were convertible into legally 
accepted money (metallic money minted by the government). In other words, there was 
no real monetary policy, but rather a law or rule that determined the nature of currency 
and the guaranty underlying that currency (in this case, precious metals). 
 
The adoption and acceptance of fiduciary money (legal tender with no effective 
backing) were by no means a painless process. The hyperinflation that racked Germany 
and several Eastern European nations in the 1930s were episodes that called the 
attention of the public opinion, government authorities, politicians and all the developed 
                                                 
6 This term is used in economic literature to describe a central bank’s autonomy in conducting monetary 
policy, as an instrument designed to protect  the “guardian of the currency” against the actions of its sole 
stockholder: the government. 8
 
world in general. Fearful of taking the plunge into a currency without backing, a last 
attempt was made to preserve at least a resemblance of “monetary rules” within the 
Bretton Woods system. With this decision, the American dollar was made convertible 
into gold and all other currencies were tied to the dollar. 
 
The postwar period was one of enormous progress and big economic transformations 
and was powerfully impacted by the ideas of Lord Keynes. It was at that time that 
economists divided into two distinct views with regard to the role of money supply in an 
economy. The position of the Keynesians was that the real economy was impacted by a 
bigger or smaller money supply, thus demanding discretionary monetary policy. On the 
other hand, the monetarists convinced themselves that currency had little impact on the 
real economy and, consequently, backed the adoption of monetary rules.  
 
It was at this point in time that the debate regarding central bank independence came to 
the surface and rules versus discretion debate was incorporates into the discussion. 
Rigid monetary rules should be adopted or monetary policy should be implemented in a 
responsible and flexible manner in light of the circumstances prevailing in an economy. 
With the end of the gold standard, a void had to be filled: a new and rigid set of rules or 
the granting of discretionary powers to an independent central bank? The fact of the 
matter is that economists do not have a clear and unequivocal answer to this query even 
today. Theoretical evidence exists to support monetary policy rules
7, but there has never 
been a consensus as to the definition of a specific rule.
8 Though there is evidence to 
support central bank independence, there has never been a consensus regarding the 
institutional format of that independence.
9 
 
                                                 
7 See KIDLAND & PRESCOTT (1977). 
8 The most emphatic and best known defense of monetary rules was put forward by Milton Friedman in 
his discussion of constant monetary growth (see FRIEDMAN, 1968). 
9 There are many highly distinct images of the role of a central bank and monetary policy. The 
monetarists (e.g. FRIEDMAN, 1968) defend a dependent central bank with preordained rules to avoid the 
discretion of an independent monetary authority. The Keynesians, on the other hand, defend an 
autonomous central bank embodied with this discretionary powers and some degree of basic coordination 
with the Treasury. For detailed presentations of the positions involving “rules versus discretionary 
authority” and “central bank independence versus macroeconomic coordination”, see BRYANT, 1980, 
chapter 18. 9
 
In this framework, what would seem to prevail is the tendency to maintain a 
discretionary monetary policy, in which the money supply is fine-tuned according to the 
needs of the economy. At the same time, in the more democratic societies, the 
population would not seem willing to grant such discretionary authority to the 
government, prefering to delegate this power to an independent central bank. There is a 
sense of concern and misgiving rooted in a consensus among economists: monetary 
stability is an important precondition for long-term growth and inflation is a socially 
regressive tax. 
 
Two major aspects must be stressed when discussing the question of central bank 
“independence”. In the first place, one must keep in mind that the concept of central 
bank autonomy is basically a monetary policy matter. Secondly, this autonomy is a 
question of degree, since we are in an obviously interdependent world. There is also a 
fundamental “democratic” concern in this aspect: how can a government institution 
have a mandate  with  potential for conflict with other areas of a democratically elected 
government? In this sense, central bank independence reflects a higher degree of 
autonomy granted by society to that institution with the greater objective of preserving 
an enhanced level of price stability.
10 
 
Since there is a direct relationship between central bank independence and monetary 
policy, the dimensions of the institution’s power to formulate and implement that policy 
are obviously the elements of greatest importance. When other objectives and functions, 
such as responsibility for banking supervision, are imposed on a central bank, the result 
will be an institution with multiple objectives competing for priority. Such a situation, 
evidently, is fraught with potential for generating detrimental impact on the fundamental 
goal of monetary stability. Those central banks that have bylaws that specify that their 
greatest and only goal is to preserve monetary stability are considered to have the 
                                                 
10 According to CUKIERMAN (1992, chapter 3), among the objectives of government economic policy is 
price stability. However, other objectives of the same government tend to conflict with that goal. In this 
sense, a central bank that is given a certain degree of autonomy and that has a preponderant concern with 
price stability will tend to prioritize that objective over all others pursued by the government. 10
 
highest degree of independence. And this independence is seen to be even greater when 
banking supervision is excluded from the institution’s responsibilities.
11 
 
Though it is unanimously accepted that banking supervision should not be included 
among the responsibilities of an “independent central bank”, there is no consensus as to 
whether monetary policy is more effective when the central bank is not the supervisory 
entity. The last two chairmen of the North-American Federal Reserve System – a 
notorious independent central bank – are vehement in defense of their bank supervisory 
powers.
12 As we will see below, their positions are usually based on macroeconomic 
concerns as monetary and payment systems stability, aside from the question of 
discount window operations. 
 
However, those who defend the position of central banks with supervisory powers do 
not restrict their arguments to questions typical of the supervisory area. During a 
testimony on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee of the United States 
Senate in 1994, Alan Greenspan stated that “joint responsibilities make for better 
supervisory and monetary policy than would result from either a supervisor divorced 
from economic responsibilities or a macroeconomic policy maker with no involvement 
in the review of individual banks’ operations”.
13 
 
If the “bank of banks” had better information on the health of individual banks, it would 
certainly avoid “discount window” operations with insolvent institutions and, 
consequently, better protect monetary policy. However, this is not the only advantage: 
access to the confidential information obtained through supervisory activities can be an 
important monetary policy instrument not only in light of the important role banks play 
in an economy, but also because problems perceived within banks can often be the 
harbinger of significant difficulties in the economy as a whole. Evidence exists that a 
                                                 
11 Several studies that have attempted to demonstrate an inverse correlation between inflation and the 
varied degrees of central bank independence have utilized this position as their underlying premise. See, 
for example, ALESINA & SUMMERS (1993) and CUKIERMAN (1992). 
12 For instance, both Paul VOLCKER (in VOLCKER, MANCERA & GODEAUX, 1991, pg. 47/52), and 
Alan GREENSPAN (see HAUBRICH, 1996) explicitly defend greater central bank involvement in bank 
supervision activities. 
13 See PEEK, ROSENGREN & TOOTELL (1997), pg. 01. 11
 
central bank’s privileged access to confidential banking supervision data can be 





II.2 – The supervisory perspective 
 
There is no clearly defined concern or debate in specialized literature on banking 
supervision, dealing with the question of whether this responsibility should be included 
among a central bank’s function.  Based on the essential complementary relation that 
exists between these objectives (currency and banking system stability), there are strong 
and well-founded reasons for opposing a complete dissociation between a central bank 
and the bank supervisory authority,
15 particularly in light of the central bank’s role as 
lender of last resort to banks. However, when the concept of moral hazard, drawn from 
literature on deposit insurance, is injected into this scenario, it becomes somewhat more 
difficult to defend this position. 
 
Aside from commercial banks being part of the payment system, banks and other 
financial institutions are the intermediaries of money and credit operations of economic 
agents, where the interest rate are formed. And it is precisely here that one perceives the 
strong correlation between macroeconomic stability and financial system health.
16 A 
nation’s macroeconomic difficulties affect the solvency and liquidity of the banking 
system, at the same time in which insolvent banks and financial institutions can imperil 
both the efficient operation of an economy and the effectiveness of a government’s 
economic policy. 
 
In general, banking insolvency is caused by poor management, excessive risk taking, 
fraud and unforeseen changes in the economic environment that generate negative 
impacts on loan and investment returns.  It is with the latter item in mind that many 
                                                 
14 The study by PEEK, ROSENGREN & TOOTELL (1997) seeks to demonstrate the hypothesis that 
privileged access to information on the financial health of banks can affect the economy’s response to 
monetary policy. 
15 See DUQUESNE (1997) and LINDGREN, GARCIA & SAAL (1996), pg. 134. 12
 
observers consider the financial system to be a highly sensitive thermometer of a 
country’s economy, since alterations in the overall situation or in the real side of the 
economy have a powerful impact on the solvency of banks and financial institutions, as 
reflected in their operations with clients and, principally, in the quality of their loans. 
 
Economic policy, in turn, is impacted by financial system fragility and unsoundness, 
particularly in terms of the fiscal and monetary impacts caused by bank failures. 
Insolvent financial institutions no longer have the capacity to respond coherently to 
market incentives and economic policy stimuli, especially in the area of monetary 
policy. Banking system fragility stands as an important obstacle to interest rate 
increases and, therefore, to implementation of a restrictive monetary policy. The 
impacts caused by banking and financial systems on the economy as a whole are a 
source of growing concern in all countries.  With the exponential increase in 
international economic and financial transactions in recent years, concern with financial 
system stability and soundness has become a question of international scope. As the 
economic and financial systems of the different markets and countries become 
increasingly interdependent, the risk of contagion generated by problems initially 
circumscribed to specific localities has increased. 
 
Since it would not be feasible to create an international supervisory entity, the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision was founded in 1977 under the auspices of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Known as the Basle Committee, this entity 
has fostered introduction of various types of mechanisms and information exchanges 
among national supervisory agencies, in an attempt to attain at least some degree of 
control over the international financial system by establishing mechanisms of control 
over the banking systems of each country. The Basle Committee has disseminated   
qualitative standards to be followed by bank supervision authorities,
17 including 
recommendations with respect to the question of the “independence” of the supervisory 
                                                                                                                                               
16 For a more complete study on the interrelations between a country’s economy and the solvency of its 
banking system, see LINDGREN, GARCIA & SAAL (1996), chapters 4 and 5. 
17 See the 25 “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision”, issued by the BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (1997). 13
 
entity itself,
18 without going into the question of whether supervision responsibility 
should be assigned to the central bank or another organization. 
 
Bank insolvency is the primary concern. There are no significant problems as regards 
the traditional instruments included in the bank “safety net”
19: licensing, regulations and 
financial institution supervision. The roots of current conflicts and difficulties are found 
in other components of the “safety net”: discount window operations, bank intervention 
and liquidation mechanisms and deposit insurance. In this case, one can utilize the 
classic discussion applicable to deposit insurance: the problem of moral hazard. 
 
In one form or another, all countries extend some type of “safety net” for their banks, 
but not all of them have specific deposit insurance mechanisms.  In general, these 
“safety nets” encompass central bank discount window operations and deposit insurance 
mechanisms.
20 Though these “safety nets” do provide certain benefits, they can also be a 
source of serious problems, particularly in terms of moral hazard or, in other words, 
they can encourage bankers, managers and depositors to become increasingly imprudent 
and even dishonest, since they are not always held accountable for the consequences of 
defaults at their institutions.
21 
 
The protection offered through deposit insurance is frequently condemned on the basis 
of the argument of “moral hazard”, principally when this protection is unlimited. 
However, in the absence of this type of mechanism, the negative impact of “moral 
hazard” can be even greater, if large scale depositors and banks become convinced that 
the government will eventually intervene and rescue all concerned.
22 A good deposit 
                                                 
18 “Independence” in the sense of “operational autonomy” to perform its functions free of political 
pressures, but with due accountability. This recommendation is part of the first of the 25 principles listed 
under the “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision”. 
19 According to DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT & KANE (1997), the concept of deposit insurance can be much 
broader and be used to define a complex of instruments aimed to provide a “safety net” to depositors 
(deposit insurance, lender of last resort, banking supervision, bank restructuring instruments, etc.). See 
LUNDBERG (1999) for a more detailed discussion of these instruments. 
20 See ENOCH, STELLA & KHAMIS (1997), pg. 10/11. 
21 In his analysis of bank “safety nets”, CALOMIRES (1997) also questions deposit insurance 
mechanisms since they make it more difficult to impose market discipline and generate problems of moral 
hazard. 
22 An interesting comparative analysis between a system of indemnity paid to depositors without deposit 
insurance (implicit protection) and a formal system of protection can be found in TALLEY & MAS 
(1990), pg. 13/14. 14
 
insurance system not only frees the government from the burden of providing coverage 
to depositors but also greatly reduces the discretionary content of the solutions provided 
to depositors and can even reduce “moral hazard” caused by the government having to 
constantly ride to the rescue.
23 
 
In summary, from the banking supervision point of view, it is recommended to have 
cooperation between the supervisory authority and the monetary authority, since the 
central bank is still the lender of last resort, which is one of the classic instruments of 
the banking “safety net”. In this case, specific literature on deposit insurance indicates 
that the only question remaining is that of moral hazard, meaning that the central bank 




II.3 – Advantages and disadvantages of banking supervision within the central 
bank 
 
The argument most commonly utilized to defend the separation of banking supervision 
from the monetary authority is that of conflict of interest. Evidently, the premise 
underlying this type of argument is that of “central bank independence” or, in other 
words, preservation of the “guardian of the currency”. Financial assistance to banks 
through discount window operations may, in some cases, become excessive and 
jeopardize monetary policy as a whole.
24 With the influence banks often have over the 
central bank, the institution may be tempted to give greater priority to bank protection 
than to the public interest.
25 
 
The most significant conflict, however, involves the setting of interest rates. If the 
central bank is also the supervisory authority, it may encounter difficulties in raising 
interest rates to avoid inflation, since this can also be detrimental to the financial health 
of banks. The greater the operational gaps found among financial institutions – the lack 
                                                 
23 ENOCH, STELLA & KHAMIS (1997), pg. 10/11, explicitly defend maintenance of some ambiguity 
only in the definition of the nature of the large banks for purposes of offering differentiated protection. 
24 See DUQUESNE (1997), pg. 393, and GOODHART & SCHOENMAKER (1995), pg. 545. 15
 
of compatibility between short-term or indexed liabilities and long-term loans and assets 




On the other hand, some observers utilize the argument of conflict of interest to defend 
maintenance of supervisory activities within the central bank. A central bank without 
supervisory authority would tend to neglect the impact of monetary policy on the 
banking system and, consequently, on the economy.
27 However, those who are in favor 
of central bank independence argue that, in most cases, the difficulties experienced by 
the banking system are not caused by monetary policy, but rather by the poor quality of 
assets, insufficient capital, fraud, etc.
28 or, in other words, deficiencies within the banks 
themselves or within the supervisory institution. 
 
Those who defend placing bank supervision responsibilities in the hands of the 
monetary authority utilize two fundamental arguments. The first involves the strategic 
role of the payment system in the economy, since systemic risks are transmitted 
precisely through the payment clearing system. This was the principal argument put 
forward by Alan GREENSPAN on his testimony to the Congress in 1993-94, defending 
the role of the FED in banking supervision.
29 
 
The second argument involves the question of resolving systemic crises, since the 
central bank is the “lender of last resort” to the banking system. The key question is that 
of identifying when discount window operations can be used legitimately to aid banks, 
when viewed against the backdrop of the other alternatives available to the supervisory 
authority in its efforts to avoid moral hazard.
30 
 
Banks do not necessarily have a right to discount window operations. The monetary 
authority should base these operations on the principle of only lending to illiquid banks, 
but with no solvency problems. This rule applies to liquidation of small and medium 
                                                                                                                                               
25 See HAUBRICH (1996), pg. 3. 
26 See DUQUESNE (1997), pg. 393/4 and GOODHART & SCHOENMAKER (1995), PG. 546/7. 
27 See HAUBRICH (1996), pg. 3 and DUQUESNE (1997), pg. 397. 
28 See SWINBURNE & CASTELO-BRANCO (1991), pg. 439. 
29 See DUQUESNE (1997), pg. 395/6. 16
 
banks but not to large banks, since the failure of one of these institutions could generate 
systemic risks. The question that arises, therefore, is how is the central bank to know if 
a bank is insolvent, if it is not the supervisory entity?  How is one to identify and decide 
which cases involve systemic risk
31 and which, therefore, justify central bank and even 
government assistance. 
 
These situations are used by those who defend concentrating supervisory authorities in 
the central bank to support their position. They argue that a central bank with 
supervisory authority is important in times of crisis, since the institution is able to 
provide needed information rapidly. At such times, it becomes very difficult to translate 
information and diagnoses rapidly into written form for transmission to another 
institution.  The preservation of supervisory authority within the central bank makes it 
possible for that institution to react much more quickly than would be possible were it 
necessary to coordinate measures with another independent entity.
32 
 
On the other hand, those who defend the separation argue that better quality information 
is obtained when the two types of authority are distributed into different institutions.
33 
Those who support an independent central bank use practically the same argument, 
claiming that, in moments of crises, a central bank that is also charged with supervision 
would be much more vulnerable to a vast array of political pressures.
34 With the same 
intention of safeguarding the guardian of the nation’s currency in times of crisis, those 
who defend “central bank independence” argue that the monetary authority should not 
be involved in bank interventions and liquidations, since such operations have potential 
for damaging the good name and reputation of the central bank itself.
35 
 
Finally, the question of market discipline is raised as an additional and important 
argument for separating the monetary authority from the supervisory authority. This 
                                                                                                                                               
30 See GOODHART & SCHOENMAKER (1995), pg. 549/9 and DUQUESNE (1997), pg. 393. 
31 One of the explanations for systemic risk is that it is often a consequence of asymmetric information 
between the bank and its clients, making it difficult for clients to identify the quality of a bank’s assets. 
Given this uncertainty, any doubts whatsoever with respect to the solvency of a bank can easily trigger a 
run on that institution (see DUQUESNE, 1997, pg. 397). 
32 See HAUBRICH (1996), PG. 3-4.   
33 Idem, pg. 4. 
34 See SWINBURNE & CASTELO-BRANCO (1991), pg. 439/40. 
35 See GOODHART & SCHOENMAKER (1995), pg. 548 and HAUBRICH (1996), pg. 5. 17
 
argument is based upon the literature dealing with deposit insurance and the question of 
moral hazard. If more rigid regulations were adopted with respect to discount window 
operations, making it much more difficult for financial institutions to access central 
bank credits, even in times of crisis, there is little doubt that banks, financial institutions 
and even the bank supervisory authority would become more efficient and effective in 




Unfortunately, however, separating banking supervision from the central bank does not 
necessarily result in elimination of the problem of moral hazard. Supervisory authorities 
and the banks may well believe that the central bank will always come to the rescue 
and, with this in mind, they may well be tempted to become more lax in relation to 
supervision or to neglect the need for market discipline. The larger the bank 
experiencing difficulties, the greater will be the problem of moral hazard (“too big to 
fail”), thus creating situations in which the central bank will be obligated to intervene to 
avoid systemic risk. Though a deposit insurance system outside the central bank would 




However, the market discipline/moral hazard argument was, unfortunately, unable to 
survive the empirical tests performed by Professors Charles Goodhart and Dirk 
Schoenmaker.
38  They came to the conclusion that, in countries in which the central 
bank is the supervisory authority, there were less bank failures. They also uncovered 
evidence in these countries that there was less use of public resources in resolving the 
problems of insolvent banks, by greater utilization of central bank and commercial bank 
resources.  One possible explanation for this evidence may be that a central bank with 
supervisory powers may well be in a position to respond more rapidly to banking 
difficulties and to cope with them before they evolve into more serious situations.
39 
                                                 
36 See DUQUESNE, 1997, pg. 394/5. 
37 Idem, pg. 395. See also ENOCH, STELLA & KHAMIS (1997). 
38 See GOODHART & SCHOENMAKER (1995), pg. 549/55, in which the authors summarize a study 
they carried out in 1993 dealing with 104 failed banks in 24 countries dating to the 1980s and early 
1990s. 
39 It is interesting to note that, in Japan where the central bank does not have supervisory powers, the 





III – Empirical evidence 
 
III.1 – Supervisory authority outside central bank 
 
International empirical evidence would seem to indicate a clear tendency to withdraw 
supervisory authority from central banks and delegate it to specialized agencies. A 1995 
survey by Goodhart and Schoenmaker
40 shows that supervisory authority still remained 
within the central bank in approximately half the countries surveyed. According to these 
researchers,
41 the German tradition has impacted many countries, particularly those 
located within Germany’s sphere of influence (Austria, Switzerland and the 
Scandinavian countries) while, with the exception of Canada, the English tradition of 
maintaining supervisory authority within the central bank dominated in countries under 
its influence (Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Ireland). 
 
However, in 1997, England went against its own tradition and decided to withdraw 
banking supervision from the monetary authority. In the following year, Australia and 
Korea moved in the same direction. It is important to take a closer look at this process. 
A different study was carried out by Ernesto Aguirre, dealing with the Latin American 
banking systems.
42 According to this 1997 survey, out of a total of 17 nations studied, 
only five (including Brazil) maintained banking supervision authority within their 
central banks. The authors opted to include Argentina among these five countries, even 
though supervisory authority was removed from the central bank and placed within a 
Superintendency, considered by the authors to be a full subsidiary of the central bank. 
 
Based on information we have been able to gather over the Internet (see appendix), we 
have managed to collect data on 40 countries. Of these, banking supervision authority in 
25 is concentrated in an organization outside the central bank, while 13 have opted to 
                                                 
40 Idem, appendix to pg. 558/59. 
41 See pg. 544. 
42 See Aguirre (1997). 19
 
leave this authority in the hands of the central bank. Two countries have institutional 
arrangements that are not very clear: Argentina has transferred authority to a central 
bank subsidiary and France has three Councils that hold decision-making authority in 
the area of banking supervision, though the activity itself is performed by the Bank of 
France. 
 
If we classify Argentina has having its supervisory authority outside the central bank 
and France as having it within the central bank, we conclude that about two-thirds of the 
countries (26 out of 40, or 65%) have adopted  the model of banking supervision 
authority outside the central bank. At the moment, we are trying to identify the dates on 
which these countries decided to separate monetary and supervisory authorities, so as to 
be able to perceive whether this is a tendency that has marked recent years. Though the 
study has not yet been completed, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
situation has changed greatly in the last 10 or 15 years. Prior to that period, the situation 
was just the opposite with about two-thirds of the countries involved concentrating 
supervisory authority within their respective central banks.
43 
 
In our survey of international experience with respect to the separation of supervisory 
activities from the monetary authority, particular attention was given to the question of 
how countries were resolving the question of payment system supervision. Among the 
countries in which supervisory authority has been removed from the central bank 
(including Argentina and France), we were able to identify the solution adopted in just 
18 of them. Among these, only in Mexico supervision of the payments system is shared 
by more than one institution. The Banco de Mexico regulates the system and performs 
inspection with the help of the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores. In all of the 
other 17 countries, the regulating and inspection of clearance services for large 
transactions is always the responsibility of the monetary authority, which means that, 
though central banks are clearly losing their bank supervisory powers, they are 
evidently maintaining control over the payment systems of the various countries. 
 
                                                 
43 Australia and Korea withdrew banking supervision from their central banks in 1998. England followed 




III.2 – Consolidated supervision 
 
One of the major contributions of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is the 
recommendation regarding consolidated supervision of financial groups.  Concerned 
with the question of the solvency of financial banking groups, the first Basle Accord 
(1975) defined the principle of consolidated supervision of international financial 
groups.  The question is considered so important that it was included as the 20
th of the 
25 basic principles for effective banking supervision: “An essential element of banking 
supervision is the ability of the supervisors to supervise the banking group on a 
consolidated basis”. This recommendation encompasses nonbanking activities, since 
these can imperil banking activities.
44 
 
This concern, obviously, is not restricted only to financial banking activities, but also 
encompasses other segments of the financial system (securities and insurance markets), 
since they must also allocate capital to cope with the risks implicit in their activities. It 
was with this in mind that the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates was founded in 
1996, under the auspices of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 
 
The Joint Forum has produced a series of documents containing recommendations.
45 
Among these, we would highlight the “Capital Adequacy Principles”, the “Principles 
for Supervisory Information Sharing” and “Coordinator”, the latter of which is a guide 
for coordinating the joint supervisory operations of  different supervisory agencies 
during inspections at large scale financial conglomerates. With the exception of support 
for some degree of autonomy for supervisory agencies, one should note that these 
institutions foster international cooperation in the supervision of banks, securities and 
                                                                                                                                               
(1997), many Latin American countries opted to do this in the same period, though it has not been 
possible to come to a precise date on which this occurred in each of these nations. 
44 See “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” of the BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS (1997). 21
 
insurance markets and have avoided making any recommendations regarding the 
institutional and political organization of each member country, while concentrating 
exclusively on the technical and operational aspects of supervision. 
 
Nonetheless, it would seem clear that the best coordination of consolidated supervision 
of large financial groups is obtained when these functions are integrated into a single 
agency. With the exception of several position statements regarding the merger of 
supervisory entities
46, there is very little discussion of this subject in pertinent literature. 
However, these merger processes are being implemented, principally in countries in 
which the financial system is not divided into segments, as in the case of the United 
States.  
 
According to a survey covering 40 countries (see appendix), of the 26 countries in 
which banking supervision is not the responsibility of the central bank, we were able to 
identify 18 in which the bank supervisor is also charged with another important segment 
of the financial system (securities or insurance market). In the same survey, we 
identified 12 countries in which the supervision of financial institutions is fully 
performed by a single agency. In the majority of these countries, the decision to merge 





IV – Conclusion and recommendations in light of the Brazilian experience 
 
Literature on the subject comes to no firm conclusion as to whether banking supervision 
is more effective under the control of the central bank or another institution. However, it 
does seem that the argument in favor of “central bank independence” now prevails and 
there is a strong international trend toward leaner and more efficient central banks, with 
supervisory functions being transferred to a highly technical specialized institution. It 
                                                                                                                                               
45 See “Supervision of financial conglomerates”, issued by the BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS (Feb. 97). 
46 See DAVIES (03.11.1999) and RODGERS (May 1998). 22
 
seems that the loss of the supervisory function has often been a political bargaining chip 
sacrificed in the interest of central bank independence, avoiding to have the central bank 
transformed into a “fourth power” of government. 
 
Obviously, in modern democracies, “central bank independence” is a restricted concept 
targeted at ensuring a single objective: the stability of the currency or prices. The 
institution’s mandate is to wield discretionary power in the implementation of monetary 
policy and be held accountable for the measures taken and results achieved.  Authority 
is restricted to monetary policy (freedom with responsibility to issue currency) and 
includes no other type of power, particularly that of spending scarce public funding. In a 
democracy, the power to spend is necessarily subjected to the budget ritual and requires 
prior approval and supervision on the part of the Congress.  This could well be 
considered the political explanation of why this “independence” in other countries does 
not include banking supervision. 
 
The assumption of bank supervision and inspection responsibilities generates costs, 
risks and responsibilities. Banking supervision is a highly complicated task that requires 
a type of competence and skill levels quite different from those demanded at a classic 
central bank. Monetary and exchange policies belong to the world of the economists, 
while banking supervision pertains to the world of the auditors.  Though there are strong 
arguments in favor of maintaining the two functions at a single institution due to the 
complementary nature of the objectives involved (stability of the currency and of the 
financial system), the final result of this option may well be a loss of efficiency, without 
even mentioning the burdens and responsibilities that would have to be borne as a 
consequence of banking sector difficulties. 
 
However, the major concern is found in the costs of liquidating banks and, principally, 
the risk of insolvency of large banks with the potential to generate harmful 
consequences for the system as a whole and the need for structuring rescue operations. 
These outlays can be very high and, if they are not covered by fiscal resources, they are 
                                                                                                                                               
47 Australia and Korea in 1998, England in 1997, Mexico in 1995, Denmark in 1988, Canada in 1987 and 
Norway in 1986. According to AGUIRRE (1997), other Latin American countries  did the same thing in 
the period, though it was not possible to identify the precise dates on which these changes occurred. 23
 
capable of jeopardizing monetary policy as a whole.  To a great extent, this concern can 
be resolved through an adequate deposit insurance system. However, final responsibility 
will always be placed at the government and central bank which, as lender of last resort 
to the banking system, will always have a role even when it is not charged with 
supervisory responsibility.  
 
In this light, we have strong restrictions regarding the withdrawal of banking 
supervision from Banco Central do Brasil in the form usually proposed in Brazilian 
political circles, without granting independence to the institution. Aside from the fact 
that this would not generate any significant advantages, we would run the risk of 
weakening monetary policy implementation and the institution’s capacity to cope with 
crisis situations or financial system problems. Based on both international and Brazilian 
experience, it would only make sense to separate these two functions if the central bank 
were to be given greater independence and the functions of supervision of financial 
institutions, including the securities, insurance and private pension funds, were to be 
merged within a single agency. 
 
In the international framework, the tendency has been to remove banking supervision 
from central bank responsibility in order to preserve and strengthen that institution’s 
role as “guardian of the currency”. This is a tendency that makes good sense in Brazil, a 
country that, for many years, suffered the effects of a weak central bank totally 
subservient to the whims of central government authorities. The argument in favor of an 
“independent central bank” can certainly be used as a way of protecting Brazilian 
society from the eventual irresponsibility of future governments. Price stability is a 
greater good, obtained at the cost of enormous sacrifice of great part of our population, 
and it must not be imperiled to eventual election of a bad government. 
 
Joint financial system supervision is another tendency commonly found on the 
international experience. This involves the merger of bank supervision authority with 
the other entities responsible for regulating and supervising other financial market 
segments (securities, insurance and private pension funds), thus facilitating the 
consolidated supervision of financial groups. This is an interesting alternative for Brazil, 
since it simply would not make sense to withdraw supervision from the central bank and 24
 
create another supervisory entity without giving it the power and prestige required to 
perform its tasks. If this were to be done, the new institution would become just one 
more weak supervisory authority among the several that already exist, such as the CVM 
(Securities and Exchange Commission) and SUSEP (Private Insurance Authority). 
 
If a decision is to be taken in this direction, we have to be sure that the separation of the 
monetary authority and the supervisory authority will not result in two weak 
institutions. The first step would be to establish obligatory channels of coordination 
between the two entities so that Banco Central do Brasil would continue having 
privileged access to information on bank solvency. The second is the question of 
retaining responsibility for regulating and supervising the major systems of clearance 
and liquidation of financial transactions at Banco Central (check clearance services, the 
SELIC government bond’ clearing house and CETIP securities clearing house, etc.). 
The underlying reasons for this position are the simple fact that Banco Central’s 
responsibility for monetary policy demands that it monitor the health of the nation’s 
banks and payment systems. 
 
A further source of concern is the question of resolving problems found to exist at 
financial institutions. Great care will have to be taken in coordinating the authority of 
the supervisory authority with that of Banco Central, since the latter will continue 
bearing the burden of “lender of last resort”. Parallel to this, there is a need for 
discussing the entire question of  deposit insurance, which is now managed by a non-
central bank private sector entity. Once access to discount window operations is no 
longer available, it might be interesting to place management of deposit insurance under 
the authority of the supervisory agency, since this would clearly enhance its capacity to 
respond to specific problems as they arise. Finally, a great deal of discernment must be 
used in distinguishing between regulatory responsibility for banking supervision and 
responsibilities that are typical of credit and exchange policy, so that there are no 
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